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Introduction to Section VI:
Understanding and Improving Our
Judicial System
An independent judiciary is one of the cornerstones of democ-
racy in the United States,1 and judicial independence ensures that
courts are insulated from “arbitrary and irrelevant influences.”2
Although judicial independence attempts to prevent outside influ-
ences from infiltrating judicial decision making, courts must contin-
ually balance competing interests that exist within the judicial
system.  In her closing remarks at the 2010 Penn State Law Review
Symposium, Chief Judge Lee H. Rosenthal eloquently summarized
these competing interests, which are inherent to the judicial system
and the legal profession at large:  “one of the most difficult and . . .
permanent problems which a legal system must face is a combina-
tion of a due regard for . . . substantial justice with a system of
procedure rigid enough to be workable.”3  Indeed, courts continu-
ally adopt alternative methods designed to help litigants achieve
“substantial justice” more efficiently; however, whether such proce-
dures actually achieve just outcomes or make the justice system
more efficient, is debatable.4  Even more debatable is the notion of
what constitutes “substantial justice.”
The opinions of the late Supreme Court Justice Harry Black-
mun suggest that ensuring justice requires judges to consider the
unique circumstances of particular litigants.  From his opinions ad-
1. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 n.10
(1982) (referencing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
2. John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:  Explaining Judi-
cial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 369 (1999).  However, some debate
whether the current presidential administration threatens justice independence.
See Robert Reich, Now Trump Is Threatening the Independence of Judges, NEWS-
WEEK (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:58 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/robert-reich-now-
trump-threatening-independence-judges-590653 (summarizing several of Donald
Trump’s recent statements, which criticizes the opinions of federal judges).
3. Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, Closing Keynote: Pleading, for the Future: Conver-
sations After Iqbal, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1537, 1539 (2010) (quoting CHARLES E.
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING vii–viii (2d ed. 1947).
4. Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165,
195 (2003) (explaining that while alternative dispute resolution programs were de-
signed to streamline access to the courts, many programs make it harder for liti-
gants to bring cases).
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dressing preclusion between state and federal cases,5 to perhaps his
most famous opinion regarding abortion rights,6 Justice Blackmun
emphasized the need for judicial flexibility to consider “all relevant
factors”7 in a case because he believed that the Constitution itself
required “flexibility” to account for “improvement[s] in standards
of decency as society progresses.”8  In his jurisprudence, Justice
Blackmun heavily weighed individual liberties over competing in-
terests,9 and the topics he analyzed in many of his seminal cases
continue to be litigated today.10
Just as disputes over the issues addressed by Justice Blackmun
remain today, the inherent conflict in the judicial system between
achieving substantial justice and maintaining workable procedures
remain as well.  The following articles, which were previously pub-
lished in the Dickinson Law Review, continue to offer guidance in
the present on how best to balance conflicting interests within the
judicial system.
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5. Judge Karen Nelson Moore, Justice Blackmun and Preclusion in State-Fed-
eral Context, 97 DICK. L. REV. 465, 469 (1993) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 112 (1980)).
6. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
7. Moore, supra note 5.
8. Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion into the Province of Judging: Jus-
tice Blackmun and the Outsiders, 97 DICK. L. REV. 527, 530 (1993) (quoting Jack-
son v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
9. See generally Diane Wood, Justice Blackmun and Individual Rights, 97
DICK. L. REV. 421 (1993) (analyzing Justice Blackmun’s opinions pertaining to the
protection of individual liberties).
10. See, e.g., Mark Berman, Trump Promised Judges Who Would Overturn
Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017, 10:02 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/2017/live-updates/trump-white-house/neil-gorsuch-confirmation-hear
ings-updates-and-analysis-on-the-supreme-court-nominee/trump-promised-judges-
who-would-overturn-roe-v-wade/?utm_term=.C020757f0459.
